

1	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA
2	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF YAVAPAI
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4	THE STATE OF ARIZONA,
5	Plaintiff,)
6	vs.) No. CR 2008-1339
7	STEVEN CARROLL DEMOCKER,)
8	Defendant.)
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11	BEFORE: THE HONORABLE THOMAS B. LINDBERG JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
12	DIVISION SIX YAVAPAI COUNTY, ARIZONA
13	TAVALAT SOONTY ANTBOWN
14	PRESCOTT, ARIZONA THURSDAY, MAY 27, 2010
15	2.05 P.M.
16	REPORTER'S PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
17	EVIDENTIARY HEARING
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19	TESTIMONY OF PROFESSOR MICHAEL SAKS
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24	ROXANNE E. TARN, CR Certified Court Reporter
25	Certificate No. 50808

MAY 27, 2010 1 2:05 P.M. 2 EVIDENTIARY HEARING 3 4 APPEARANCES: FOR THE STATE: MR. JOE BUTNER AND MR. JEFF 5 FOR THE DEFENDANT: MR. JOHN SEARS, MR. LARRY HAMMOND AND MS. ANNE CHAPMAN. 6 7 MR. HAMMOND: Your Honor, if you are prepared 8 to proceed with the resumption of this morning's hearing, we 9 are prepared to call Professor Michael Saks. 10 THE CLERK: You do solemnly swear or affirm 11 under the penalty of perjury that the testimony you are about 12 to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 13 the truth, so help you God? 14 THE WITNESS: I do. 15 THE COURT: Spell your last name, if you 16 17 would. THE WITNESS: S-A-K-S. 18 MICHAEL J. SAKS, 19 called as a witness, having been duly sworn, testified as 20 21 follows: DIRECT EXAMINATION 22 BY MR. HAMMOND: 23 O. Good afternoon. Would you please give us your 24 full name again for the record here. 25

My name is Michael J. Saks, S-A-K-S. 1 Α. 2 Professor Saks, where are you presently employed? I teach at the Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law 3 at the Arizona State University. 4 And what field do you teach in, please? 5 0. I mostly teach law and science, but also teach 6 criminal law, the substantive criminal law, evidence, 7 sometimes torts and a couple of times property, but the focus 8 9 is mostly law and science courses. What kinds of courses in the field of law and 10 Ο. science do you teach at -- can I just call it ASU? 11 12 Α. Okay. I know it is against the rules there to call it 13 Q. other than the Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law, but maybe 14 we can shorten it, as long as you don't tell anybody. 15 If the Court so orders, I could go with it. 16 Maybe if it was the James Rogers School of Law we 17 0. would approach it slightly differently. 18 THE COURT: Probably not. 19 THE WITNESS: I teach a course called Law 20 Litigation and Science, which has a lot of social science 21 evidence, but its main goal is help the law students begin to 22 become conversant with the notions of empirical research, and 23 to read a lot of cases where courts have been presented with 24 empirical research. And another layer of that is to try to 25

understand the jurisprudence of what courts are doing with cases where factual evidence, sometimes the kind that I am sure comes into this court frequently, but also factual evidence that is used for courts to find legislative facts to make law. That is one course

I have also taught courses in the law pertaining specifically to forensic science, typically seminars. And -BY MR. HAMMOND:

- Q. Give us a couple of the most recent, if you will, kind of thumbnail of the course descriptions of the most recent forensic science related seminars.
- A. The one I taught this past Spring was focused on forensic science and wrongful convictions, and was to a large extent prompted by the National Research Counsel -- sometimes it is called National Research Counsel, sometimes National Academy of Sciences. It would be like talking about ASU, the big umbrella, and the department or college within ASU would be the smaller group. NRC is the smaller group.

Students read portions of that, read lots of cases in which -- well, they read Frye. They read all of the whole -- the Paubert trilogy. They read Daubert on remand. They read lots of cases in which courts were presented with challenges to the admissibility of forensic science. It was a seminar, so and they each picked out

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little projects and wrote papers on those and gave presentations.

And I also had -- one day we had some visitors from the real world. We had one of the managers or directors from the Mesa crime lab. You were one of the visitors from the outside world.

- Q. From the real world?
- A. That is what we call it in the university.
- Q. We sometimes pause for objections, but hearing none, you might continue.
- A. And from the Attorney General's Office, we had John -- I can't remember his last name.
 - Q. Todd?

A. John Todd, T-O-D-D. So that is kind of a sketch of that.

in which the students pick -- again, it is a seminar. The students select a legal policy problem and go find all of the empirical research they can that might bear on that, and they work in little teams, a law student with a graduate student, and they review that research and write a paper on that.

- Q. How long have you been engaged in teaching?
- A. I began teaching in Autumn semester of 1974.
- Q. Have you been more or less continuously engaged

in -- primarily in law teaching? 1 Well, I began life as a professor of psychology, 2 where I did empirical research on legal policy issues. I 3 spent two years with the National Center for State Courts. 4 In my tenth year, I went off to law 5 school. Not for a JD. I went to Yale, which had a program for people in other fields, who felt we could do what we are 7 already doing better if we studied law from the inside. 8 And shortly after graduating from Yale, 9 then I started getting calls from law schools to move from 10 psychology to law. 11 And how long have you been at Arizona State? 12 Q. 13 Α. Ten years. Your degree from Yale is under what designation? 14 Q. It is called a Master of Studies in Law. 15 Α. What other degrees do you hold? 16 $Q \dots$ I have a PhD in social psychology with an emphasis 17 on research methodology and statistics. I have a Masters 18 Degree in the same field. And Bachelor of Science in 19 psychology, Bachelor of Arts in English. 20 You provided to us. and we provided to the County 21 Attorney's office, a copy of your resume. 22 MR. HAMMOND: Your Honor, may I approach? 23 THE COURT: You may. 24 MR. HAMMOND: The copy that we have here has 25

been marked for identification as Exhibit 2237. 1 Could you please identify that for us. 2 Q. 3 That is my CV. Can you glance at it for just a second and confirm 4 for us that it is a reasonably accurate, reasonably current 6 copy of your CV? Looks pretty good, unless some pages fell out of it during copying. 8 MR. HAMMOND: Your Honor, rather than go 9 through everything in here, I would just like to move its 10 admission only for illustrative purposes for this hearing. 11 MR. BUTNER: No objection. 12 THE COURT: Exhibit 2237 is admitted. 13 BY MR. HAMMOND: 14 Professor Saks, this CV appears to contain a list 15 Ω. of articles and presentations that you have been involved in? 16 17 Α. Yes. Looks like you have -- lake ten of them are in the 18 time from 2009 forward. 19 It does look like there were about nine or ten 20 Α. that were published in 2009. 21 Most of those appear to be in the field of what we 22 might call forensic science or science and law. Would that 23 be fair? 24 Yes. I don't hold myself out to be any sort of 25 Α.

expert in forensic science, so I prefer to think of them as articles that talk about the interface of forensic science and law or other science and law.

Q. We are going to talk this afternoon about probably three areas. And I know that you have pulled up some Power Point slides in areas that might be of assistance to you in illustrating your responses to our questions. And just to give you and the Court a quick road map here, I would like to talk to you first about science and forensic science, because as you know that is what the hearing is broadly speaking about. I would then like to visit with you some about the work of the National Academy of Sciences and the work product of the NRC.

You are - well, let me ask you. You did review the pleadings that were filed in connection with the proceeding that we are engaged in today?

A. I did.

- Q. You know that one of the issues raised and that we have asked the Court to consider is the application of the work product of the National Academy of Sciences over the last couple of years and their report and the consequences of that report?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. So I do want to have you talk to us a little bit about that as it is pertinent to this proceeding. You also

2 the standpoint of the law and science community? 3 Α. Yes. And are you also familiar with a bill that recently was signed by the governor that is known either as 5 1189, which was the bill number, or 12-2203? 6 I am familiar with that. 7 I may ask you a question or two about that from 8 the standpoint of the science and law community, and then I 9 want to talk to you a little bit about some of the testimony 10 that you have heard today. 11 You were here when both Mr. Gilkerson and 12 Mr. Hoang testified? 13 14 Α. I was. Have you also had an opportunity to review the 15 interviews that those gentleman gave in connection with this 16 17 case? I did. 18 Α. What else have you been able to review in 19 connection with our request for your assistance in this case? 20 Well, I did get my hands on a copy of Bodziak's 21 book, Footwear Impression Evidence. 22 Bodziak is the name mentioned this morning by one 23

of the witnesses who testified here?

Yes. He is a former or perhaps even remains a

are familiar with Daubert. You mentioned that earlier from

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footwear examiner at the FBI. 1 And what else have you reviewed, if anything? 2 Well, since footwear and tire impression evidence 3 is not a subject within forensic science that I have paid 4 much attention to, in addition to that I went to see what the 5 National Academy of Sciences report had to say about it. 6 They have a couple of pages that speak to that. 7 Okay. Anything else before we launch off 8 9 here? That is all I can think of and probably more than 10 11 enough. 12 Q. You know that one of the focuses of the motions that we have filed in this case goes to the general topic of 13 forensic science and expert testimony in criminal cases? 14 15 Α. Yes. I would like you to help us first by talking with 16 us a little bit about what it means in the context of our 17 criminal court systems around America to talk about science 18 in the courtroom. What denotes the concept of science in our 19 courts, and particularly in our criminal courts? 20 Well, it is an awfully broad question, so feel 21 free to stop me and reorient me. 22 MR. BUTNER: Judge, I am going to enter 23 objection at this point. It calls for a narrative on the 24 part of the witness. 25

I also note that I think this is going to be -- from what I understand of this witness's testimony -- it is going to be irrelevant and immaterial. He has indicated that he is not a forensic scientist. He is not an expert in forensic science. He has not even paid much attention to footwear and tire impressions.

It is my understanding that this gentleman is going to be testifying by way of opinion, apparently, concerning those areas of -- I think as he put it -- interfaced between the law and science, and we are not here for that reason. We are here to determine under basically a Daubert-type standard, whether the evidence presented by Mr. Gilkerson and the evidence presented by Mr. Hoang is admissible in applying the standards of Daubert.

THE COURT: Mr Hammond.

Professor Saks is probably the most qualified person, certainly in this part of the United States, to talk about what the elements, what the real understanding of the elements of what Mr. Butner calls the Daubert standard are. And we saw examples of that all morning long today of people using the words from Daubert or using the words from the Arizona Statute testing error rates, peer review, publication, as if those words might be words of common knowledge and commonly understood. They, in fact, apparently

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So our goal here is to have Professor

Saks help the government and the Court understand what those words mean in the context of science and forensic science.

He does know a great deal about the field in which these gentleman say they are a part. They say that they are a part of the field of comparative examination or impression comparison examination. This man has been working in that field literally for decades, particularly in terms of what standards we have to govern the admissibility of testimony in those fields.

accept it in the general terms that the Court is the one that has to make the decisions in connection with those issues. If there is something particular that you want to get -- if you would get to the point of what it is in particular with regard to the comments you have just made, I think we can cut through some of that.

MR. HAMMOND: Well, we may be able to.

Q. And, Professor Saks, let me ask you to do it this way. I would like to go directly to the *Daubert* terms, as they have been applied here in court today and in the interviews that you have read, and as those terms are used in 1189. And there are four or five of them that I would like you to talk to us about.

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Judge, I am going to note an MR. BUTNER: on-going objection. What Mr. Hammond, apparently, as I understand his question, is asking this witness to do is explain the words in the Daubert opinion to the Court.

Well, that is not proper subject matter for expert witness testimony or opinion. Rather, that is something that is the subject matter of American jurisprudence, so to speak, and judicial decisions that elaborate and more fully explain their prior decisions. Stare decisis, I think, is what they call that stuff.

And this gentleman has indicated that although he is a law school professor, it sounds to me as if he hasn't clearly stated he is a lawyer or a judge. I don't think he is actually either. I think he is a psychology professor with special emphasis on statistics.

THE COURT: Mr Hammond.

MR. HAMMOND: Your Honor, we anticipated Mr. Butner's objection, and I think we ought to be clear about it.

We understand that the ultimate decision that this Court has to make is a legal decision, and we are not here to ask Professor Saks to give us a legal opinion. But there are phrases and words that are used throughout this field that have dominated the work of the National Academy for the last few years, and that dominate the statute that

has recently been passed.

Those words were bandied around this courtroom this morning as if people knew what they meant, including Mr. Butner. And I think we are entitled to hear from somebody in the field, who has worked on this topic, about what these words mean to scientists who testify in court. And on that topic, I think he is extraordinarily well qualified.

THE COURT: In terms of those sorts of definitions, I will give you some leeway in making your record, but I also recognize that the Senate Bill 1889 -- MR. BUTNER: 1189.

THE COURT: Thank you. 1189 is not effective as of yet, and still have to deal with the ramifications of that issue.

will show the State's objection, in general, to the testimony of a law school professor in the area of making comments about forensic science, but I will give you some leeway to make your record on that.

MR. HAMMOND: Your Honor, you understand our view on this statute is that it is effective, technically, in late July, but the argument that we have made to the Court now in a couple of the pleadings, is that the heart of this statute and the principles underlying it, when understood

through the lens of the scientist, need to be applied today, 1 both as a constitutional matter and as an Arizona law. 2 THE COURT: I understand that is your 3 position. 4 MR. BUTNER: Judge, I would again note an 5 objection, and if I could have this witness on a very brief 6 7 voir dire. THE COURT: Go ahead. 8 VOTE DIRE EXAMINATION 9 10 BY MR. BUTNER: Professor Saks, sir, are you a scientist? 11 Q. There are times when I am engaged in doing 12 Α. science, and then I am a scientist. There are times when I 13 teach law, which is most of the time, and write legal 14 scholarship, and then I am -- I am not a lawyer, but I am a 15 legal scholar, so I am both of those things. 16 I asked you a simple question. Are you a 17 scientist, and you said you are on a part-time basis, if I 18 understood your answer. 19 I am a scientist and a law professor. 20 Α. Q. What type of a scientist are you? 21 I design and conduct empirical research on legal 22 policy matters, sometimes on forensic science, sometimes on 23 jury decision making, an array of subjects that are within 24

the legal system. But I bring the science -- I bring science

to them. If science is empirically testing, hypotheses, assumptions, that is what I do within a legal context.

Q. You do that from the point of view of a social psychology doctor; is that correct, sir?

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- A. Well, the research methodology and statistics could be done by someone from virtually any field of conventional science. It happens that I come out of the field of social psychology.
- Q. So you analyze these forensic science opinions from a statistical point of view using your background with a PhD in social psychology?
 - A. I don't understand the question.
- Q. You indicated that you set up, I believe, empirical studies of forensic science?
 - A. Would it help to give a concrete example?
 - Q. Well, I am asking you a question.
- A. Well, I think the answer is yes, but I am not sure. There is something in your tone that makes me think that you don't know what you are asking me.
- Q. I don't know what you do, sir, is what is in my tone and I am asking you.
 - A. Would it be helpful to give an example?
 - Q. Yes. Why don't you tell us what you do.
- A. Currently some colleagues and I have a grant from the National Institute of Justice to test how lay people,

such as juries, react to different kinds of presentations of 1 forensic science. The language that is used, how well do 2 3 they come to understand what it is that the witnesses are attempting to convey to them in what kinds of context. 4 So when I say we empirically study that, 5 we create scenarios. We create little trial scenarios and 6 present them to mock jurors. We systematically, experimentally vary the kind of information they are getting. 8 We vary the kinds of forensic science. We vary the degree to 9 which the evidence links the defendant to the crime scene, 10 and then give questionnaires to the jurors, the mock jurors, 11 which allows us to assess how well they understood the 12 information they were getting in the trial. 13 Indeed, we did a study -- I was asked a 14 few years ago --15 Excuse me, sir. You are embarking on a narrative 16 0.. again. I have to interrupt you for just a moment. 17 So you are saying you do studies on how 18 well jurors understand what witnesses testify to from an 19 expert point of view? 20 That was one example. It was not a narrative. 21 Α. MR. BUTNER: Thank you. 22 Judge, that has nothing to do with what 23 we are here for today. Okay. This is just opening the door 24

to this particular gentleman, apparently, embarking on a

critique of forensic science and also presenting the views contained in the National Academy of Science publication, apparently of which he was a part, concerning scientific evidence, forensic evidence, and presentation in the courts.

That is not what we are here for. We are here for an analysis under, in essence, the standards in Daubert as to whether the testimony of Mr. Gilkerson and Mr. Hoang is admissible, applying legal standards, not social science standards.

THE COURT: Mr. Hammond.

MR. HAMMOND: Your Honor, as we have said several times both in writing and in here, the standards do need to be appreciated and understood. There has been a revolution in this country in the last few years that surrounds a very few important critical words, and we think those words ought to be understood by the State and by the Court, and that is why we have asked this man to come and give us the benefit of his experience and to apply that experience in the context of the testimony that the State would have introduced as expert testimony in this case. That is what I intended to ask him about.

THE COURT: As I say, I will allow you to make your record. Overrule the objection, but let's get on with it.

MR. HAMMOND: Your Honor, I am not the one who

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has slowed this down.

THE COURT: Well. I think my comment that the testimony is, I think, purportedly of an expert in a field that relates law to forensic science, that in and of itself is not bearing directly on the question of whether I should admit or not admit the testimony of Mr. Gilkerson or Mr. Hoang, other than giving me an advisory opinion about whether I should do that or not, and I don't think that is the proper role for testimony.

MR. HAMMOND: Let's explore that, Your Honor.

One of the concepts that dominates the debates over the *Daubert* standard is the concept of testing.

And you have heard testimony this morning --

MR. BUTNER: Objection to the form of the question, Judge. We have a long, leading sort of a question here from Mr. Hammond.

THE COURT: It is foundational. Overruled.

DIRECT EXAMINATION RESUMED

BY MR. HAMMOND:

- Q. Let's talk about what the concept of testing means in the field of forensic science as it applies to expert testimony.
- A. Well, testing is the essence of all science. If we want to focus on forensic science, any assumptions, any hypotheses that a field makes, in a scientific culture what

scientists try to do is to be as critical of their own ideas 1 as they can, and they seek to test their own hypotheses. 2 There are a number of forensic sciences that used to come 3 into court quite regularly, which subsequently were withdrawn 4 5 having been finally tested empirically and found not to produce reliable results. I am thinking of bullet lead 6 7 comparison evidence. I am thinking of voice spectrometry, 8 which you may see occasionally, but it basically has disappeared from the scene, both of those as a result of 9 National Academy of Sciences studies. 10 In the field of fire and arson 11 investigation, there are something like close to two dozen 12 different indicators of arson, which were assumed for decades 13 to allow arson investigators, examiners, to distinguish 14 accidental fires from set fires, which eventually were put to 15 16 empirical tests. And it might be helpful to the Court to 17 give a very quick example of what that means. 18 19 THE COURT: I don't particularly need that.

MR. BUTNER: Thank you. This is exactly what I am talking about. It is irrelevant and immaterial, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Hammond, next question.

BY MR. HAMMOND:

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Q. This morning you may have heard Mr. Gilkerson

testify that he was a part -- his discipline was a part of a 1 2 scientific community. Do you remember him saying that this 3 morning? Α. I do. And that that scientific community was one in 5 Q. which pattern evidence was evaluated. What is your 6 understanding of the concept of pattern evidence has a 7 separate scientific community? 8 MR. BUTNER: Judge, same objection. 9 witness has clearly stated at the outset that he is not a 10 forensic scientist, not an expert in forensic science, and 11 yet he is asked to offer an opinion on something that he is 12 13 not an expert in. THE COURT: Sustained. 14 15 MR. BUTNER: Thank you. BY MR. HAMMOND: 16 Let's talk about whether in your review in the 17 whole field that you have been involved in the last couple of 18 decades, and particularly in the field of impression 19 evidence, are you aware of any testing that has been done of 20 the underlying assumptions about shoe print and tire print 21 comparison? 22 Well, I am not -- I looked through this book by 23 Bodziak looking for studies that attempted to test 24 assumptions about how one engages in those comparisons and

reaches conclusions and saw virtually no --1 MR. BUTNER: Excuse me. Objection. 3 Relevance. Lack of foundation. THE COURT: Overruled. The answer will stand. 4 BY MR. HAMMOND: 5 Have you also had an opportunity to review the 6 Q. report issued by the National Academy of Sciences? T have. 8 Are you aware of the findings of that committee 9 0. with respect to the fields of comparison evidence, and 10 particularly shoe print and tire print comparison? 11 In general, with respect to pattern comparison 12 13 evidence, the report --MR. BUTNER: Objection, Judge. This is --14 THE COURT: What is the objection? 15 MR. BUTNER: Irrelevant and immaterial. He is 16 17 asking the witness to start --THE COURT: Sustained. 18 MR. BUTNER: Thank you. 19 THE COURT: I just need a one-word objection, 20 21 please. MR. BUTNER: Thank you. 22 BY MR. HAMMOND: 23 Let's talk about the concept of peer review. 24 are aware that the witnesses who testified here this morning, 25

at least Mr. Gilkerson testified that his work was subject to 1 2 peer review, because there was another person in his office who he said apparently reviewed his work. Does that 3 constitute peer review as you understand that term in the scientific community? 5 MR. BUTNER: Objection. Foundation. 6 THE COURT: Overruled. You may answer. 7 THE WITNESS: That is not the notion -- that 8 is not the meaning of peer review as it is used in the 9 sciences, nor as it was used by the Supreme Court in Daubert. 1.0 MR. BUTNER: Objection. Move to strike the 11 last portion of this gentleman's opinion, Your Honor. 12 THE COURT: Sustained. 13 BY MR. HAMMOND: 14 What I think we ought to focus on, to help the 15 Court here, is how the concept of peer review is used in the 16 scientific community. Talk to us about what peer review 17 means. 18 Peer review is -- well, I think I would like to 19 ask a little leeway to link that to Daubert, because Daubert 20 follows -- Daubert tracks a scientific arm --21 MR. BUTNER: Objection. Foundation. 22 23 Relevance. MR. HAMMOND: Your Honor, I think because 24 25 Daubert --

1 THE COURT: Overruled. 2 MR. HAMMOND: Thank you. You may proceed. 3 0. Daubert talks about, as a pre-condition for admission of expert testimony in the sciences, especially 5 Daubert was before Kumho Tire, so they were talking only 6 about, quote, science, empirical things. And they say it 7 8 should be testable and tested. MR. BUTNER: Objection, Judge. What the 9 witness is doing is explaining the opinion to the Court. 10 THE COURT: Sustained. 11 MR. BUTNER: Thank you. 12 THE WITNESS: Peer review --13 MR. BUTNER: Objection. There is no question 14 even before the witness. 15 THE COURT: There is a question. 16 MR. BUTNER: That was sustained. 17 THE COURT: You may go back to the question 18 that was originally asked. 19 BY MR. HAMMOND: 20 The question I asked you is: Tell us what the 0. 21 concept of peer review means in respect to the scientific 22 23 community. When scientists test their ideas, test hypotheses, 24 25 they want to test them by designing studies which are capable of validly testing the proposition. They critique those at several stages. Peer review occurs at two stages. Actually occurs at many stages.

 $\label{eq:colleagues} \mbox{ If I design a study, I will show it to} \\ \mbox{colleagues.} \mbox{ I will show it to other people and ask them to} \\ \mbox{critique the study.}$

MR. BUTNER: Objection. Engaging in a narrative again, Judge.

THE COURT: Overruled.

THE WITNESS: When I go to publish that study, the journal will send the article out for peer review. That is for the purpose of the editor of the journal to get advice on whether the study is well designed and capable of testing what it set out to test.

After the study is published, there continues to be peer review because it is out in the literature and there will be criticism of the work or others will follow the work, finding it to satisfy the criteria of well designed research.

BY MR. HAMMOND:

- Q. Why is that important in the scientific community?
- A. They want every chance to get the correct answer, to not believe things that are not true, to not test many different aspects of things and be mistaken about some of them and right about others.

1	Q. And are there examples in the comparison evidence
2	field where the lack of peer review has allowed erroneous
3	testimony to be offered in criminal cases?
4	A. Well, I think there have been
5	MR. BUTNER: Objection. Leading.
6	THE COURT: Overruled.
7	THE WITNESS: Let's take microscopic hair
8	comparison, for example. Experts in microscopic hair
9	comparison had beliefs about when they could conclude that
10	two samples of hair, questioned and a known, shared common
11	source. The FBI did a study to figure out how often
12	MR. BUTNER: Objection, Judge. We are going
13	down the narrative avenue again. It is not responsive to the
14	question. He is now talking about hair studies and so forth
15	in the FBI lab. The question was talking about peer review
16	directly and specifically.
17	THE COURT: One word objection.
18	MR. BUTNER: Foundation and relevance.
19	THE COURT: Sustained.
20	MR. HAMMOND: I asked you about whether there
21	are examples of un-peer reviewed work in the evidence
22	comparison field. And I understand from the Court's
23	sustaining of that objection that you are not to answer that
24	question.

Judge, am I reading your objection

properly?

THE COURT: Yes. It has to do with relevancy and also going on with a narrative.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$ HAMMOND: I can certainly break this down into smaller questions.

THE COURT: If you shorten up the questions, I presume that the objections would be shorter as well.

MR. HAMMOND: Let's try it.

- Q. What is the relevance of requiring peer review?
- A. To make sure that the studies that are trying to make sure that the field's beliefs are correct, are well designed studies.
- Q. What is the relevance of the requirement that there be publications in any scientific field?
- A. The purpose of the publication is to get -- partly to get -- well, the main reason is to get the knowledge contained in the studies out into the world. If those studies are correct, people in that field want to know about them. You wouldn't want your cancer surgeon to not know what the research shows. But it is also an opportunity for the world to critique the studies and find the flaws and then discount the asserted conclusions.
- Q. What is an error rate? What does that phrase mean in the world of science?
 - A. In every empirical study, you get empirical

They are in a section called "results." Sometimes 1 when you are testing the accuracy of something, could be the 2 accuracy of a new technology for seeing what's going on in a 3 person's body, it could be a new technique in forensic 4 science. They tried out different techniques for how to make 5 6 comparisons. 7 MR. BUTNER: Objection. He is embarking on an area he's already testified he is not qualified to testify 8 about, Judge. Foundation. Irrelevant. 9 THE COURT: Sustained. 10 11 Get back to the question, please. BY MR. HAMMOND: 12 What is the --Ο. 13 Error rates, the meaning of error rates. 14 Α. You look to see how often a process, 15 which include a human being examining something, reaches 16 correct or incorrect answers under varying conditions and 17 circumstances, each of which will produce results, and you 18 could call those error rates. 19 This morning you heard Mr. Gilkerson from the FBI 20 Q. crime lab say that he had no errors, had a zero error rate. 21 And he told you that he had a zero error rate because, at 22 least in part, of proficiency testing, 23 What is your understanding of the 24

relationship between error rates as that term is understood

in the scientific community and the kind of proficiency testing that we heard about this morning?

A. Well, the proficiency tests, and I have looked at many of them, produce results. Some people get them right, some get them wrong, some give inconclusives. There are articles in forensic science that summarize those correct and incorrect conclusions. It could be a simple percentage.

What percentage of the examiners who took the test got it right? So, if you have 150 examiners out of the world that took a particular test, you could figure out how many got it right or wrong. That may not be an inherent error rate in the technique, but it tells you how often examiners looking at something like that get it wrong.

As to an individual examiner who says, I have taken five, ten, eleven of these tests, they are simply presented with evidence much as they would receive in their casework. They -- let's say someone gets every single one of those correct. That could be because the test is inadequately challenging. You make a test hard enough, everyone will get it wrong. You make it easy enough, everyone will get it right. Let's assume it is perfectly well-designed test.

MR. BUTNER: Objection. Foundation.
Narrative. Irrelevant.

THE COURT: Overruled.

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THE WITNESS: Then a scientist or statistician would want to put error bars around that result, which reflect the fact that it is a small sample.

BY MR. HAMMOND:

- Q. The statute and the cases, and I am not asking you for a legal opinion, but they talk about the importance of having error rates, or at least having studies of errors in any field where expert testimony will be admitted at trial.

 Why is that important in the scientific community?
- A. Within the scientific community, it is important because that has led to the elimination of some sub-areas of forensic science. They ought to want to know themselves --

MR. BUTNER: Objection. Foundation. He is offering opinion on forensic science, again, Judge.

Irrelevant, too.

THE COURT: Mr. Hammond.

MR. HAMMOND: Your Honor, Professor Saks is a well-known expert in the field of forensic science as it is practiced in our courts. One need not be a forensic scientist as such to be someone trained and have expertise in this particular field, and that is why he is here. Indeed, it is because of the forensic scientists who had no training that we have much of the problems that we have with the admission of expert testimony today.

THE COURT: Mr. Butner.

MR. BUTNER: Mr. Saks is a well-known 1 2 commentator on forensic science, with articles going back 3 many years where he has written articles about all kinds of things; handwriting, jury behavior, social psychology as applied to juries, psychologists as law professors, all sorts 6 of things. He is a commentator on all of these things. 7 is not a forensic scientist. He is not qualified as a forensic scientist to offer those kinds of opinions. He 8 writes articles about forensic scientists. 9 THE COURT: Overruled. 10 THE WITNESS: As a point -- can I just say I 11 12 have done such --13 MR. BUTNER: There is no question. THE COURT: There was a question. Restate it. 14 MR. HAMMOND: Let me go back. 15 16 The objection that you heard this afternoon is that you are not a forensic scientist, and therefore, are 17 unqualified to assist the Court in understanding the 18 application of forensic science and on course. Do you have a 19 20 response to that? May I give an analogy? If I were a 21 22 statistician --23 MR. BUTNER: Objection. Narrative. 24 Relevance. Foundation. THE COURT: Overruled. 25

who looks -- sometimes I do my own studies. Often I look at other studies that have been done. Sometimes I write articles critiquing the fact that there have been few or no studies in a field, that it simply asserts ipse dixit. If a group of doctors in a particular area would not be unhappy about having a statistician come and talk to them about what the body of research relevant to their field teaches them about what they are getting wrong.

BY MR. HAMMOND:

- Q. When we talk about the kind of testimony that the State would wish to offer in this case, you heard this morning that they wish to offer testimony that they will describe as expert testimony from someone who has done a database search. You heard that testimony?
 - A. Yes.
 - O. And you read the interviews with respect to that.
- Do you have experience in the field of scientists and experts who do database searches as part of their scientific discipline?
- A. I am aware of such work. I have not gotten involved in that.
- Q. You haven't done it yourself. I understand that. But you have been involved in the field of science where --

MR. BUTNER: Objection. Leading. 1 THE COURT: Overruled. 2 3 BY MR. HAMMOND: -- where witnesses base their testimony on the 4 search of databases? 5 6 I am aware of them. I haven't done enough -- I haven't looked in that area enough to be able to comment 7 8 intelligently. 9 MR. BUTNER: Objection. Foundation. THE COURT: There is no question. Overruled. 10 MR. BUTNER: Continuing objection to inquiry 11 along this line. He just said he is not an expert in that 12 area. He just kind of looked into that area, Judge. That is 13 what I am talking about. 14 THE COURT: All right. 15 16 BY MR. HAMMOND: Professor Saks, in the testimony this morning, you 17 heard Mr. Gilkerson testify that he was able to reach a 18 19 conclusion that one pair of shoes was similar or most closely 20 approximated a pair of shoes he saw on a database? Α. Yes. 21 You heard that testimony this morning. 22 Q. In your experience in this field, if your 23 goal is to make sure that you have reliable, testable 24 results, is this forensic science that ought to be admitted 25

in a court of law? 1 MR. BUTNER: Objection. 2 THE COURT: Sustained. 3 4 BY MR. HAMMOND: Did you find, in your examination of the testimony 5 offered in this field, deficiencies in the way in which the 6 database searches were described as being done? 7 MR. BUTNER: Objection. Foundation. 8 Relevance. 9 THE COURT: Overruled. 10 THE WITNESS: I can think of studies that 11 could be done to try to validate the best ways of doing 12 database searches, but I am not aware of those studies. 13 BY MR. HAMMOND: 14 What about the completeness of the database as 15 described here by Mr. Gilkerson? 16 MR. BUTNER: Objection. Foundation. 17 Relevance. 18 THE COURT: Sustained. 19 BY MR. HAMMOND: 20 Q. In your work in the field of forensic science, you 21 have addressed the question of the more general standard of 22 providing expert testimony that will assist the tries of 23 fact; is that correct? 24 A. Please repeat that 25

1	Q. You have looked for many years at the question of
5	what kinds of expert testimony will assist the trier of fact?
3	A. Yes.
4	Q. A lot of your work has been in that field?
5	A. Yes.
6	Q. Please tell us what touchstones you, as a
7	scientist, would find minimally necessary in order to have
8	expert testimony offered in a court of law that will assist
9	the trier of fact, as those terms have come to be used in
10	forensic science?
11	MR. BUTNER: Objection. Relevance.
12	Foundation.
13	Judge, we are not here to find out what
14	kinds of things out there could assist the trier of fact. We
15	are here on a <i>Daubert</i> -type hearing to determine the
16	admissibility of two witnesses' testimony.
17	THE COURT: Mr. Hammond.
18	MR. HAMMOND: Your Honor, I think if the
19	testimony of the witnesses this morning were understood in
20	the context of what is done in our courts to assist triers of
21	fact, I think we would find that this testimony does not
22	assist triers of fact but misleads them. That is one of the
23	purposes for asking someone who is familiar with terms in
24	this field and with the various comparison disciplines to
25	testify.

THE COURT: I will sustain as to the 1 2 particular question that was asked. 3 MR. BUTNER: Thank you. BY MR. HAMMOND: 4 Can you describe for us the -- and I will break it 5 Ο. down into smaller questions if it will assist you. б would like you to tell the Court a little bit about the work 7 8 9 10 National Academy. 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 the National Academy of Sciences. 18 THE COURT: Sustained. 19 20 21 that this man doesn't know about it? 22 23

of the National Academy of Sciences. We have a series of things that have been filed in court, I think you have probably seen all of them, talking about the work of the So let's start back in about 2007, if you will. Describe for the Court the circumstances that lead to the creation of this National Academy of Sciences community. MR. BUTNER: Objection. Relevance. And it is hearsay, and it calls for a narrative on the part of the witness. We are not here to find out about what went on with MR. HAMMOND: Your Honor, are you concluding that the work of the National Academy is not relevant, or THE COURT: I am concluding that I don't have a foundation for him to express his testimony at this point, based on what you have inquired about so far.

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7.	MR. HAMMOND: Thank you, Your Honor.				
2	Q. Let's talk about foundation then.				
3	Have you followed from beginning to end				
4	the work of the National Academy of Sciences that lead to the				
5	report entitled "Strengthening the Justice System," or words				
6	to that effect?				
7	A. Well, I didn't really become aware of it until it				
8	already existed, because I had no involvement in the National				
9	Academy of Sciences report, except to be invited to be a				
10	witness.				
11	Q. You were invited to testify before the National				
12	Academy?				
13	A. Yes.				
1.4	Q. It is actually not the academy itself; it is a				
15	committee?				
16	A. It is the Committee on Forensic Sciences or the				
17	National Research Counsel of the National Academy.				
18	Q. And who are the chairs of that committee?				
19	MR. BUTNER: Objection. Relevance.				
20	THE COURT: Sustained.				
21	BY MR. HAMMOND:				
22	Q. Did you, in fact, testify before the National				
23	Committee?				
24	MR. BUTNER: Objection. Asked and answered.				
25	THE COURT: The objection took longer than the				

BY MR. HAMMOND: 2 The answer is yes? Q. 3 4 Α. Yes. Did you communicate with members of this 5 scientific community about that work as it has been going 6 7 forward to and through the publication of the report in February of 2009? 8 MR. BUTNER: Objection. Relevance. Lack of 9 10 foundation. This witness has testified he is not an 11 expert in forensic science. He is not even a member of that 12 scientific community, Judge. 13 THE COURT: Overfuled. 14 THE WITNESS: The committee itself had public 15 hearings. The rest of its work, including drafting this 16 report, was kept under very tight wraps, and I had no 17 participation in any of that, other than being one of many 18 people who was invited to speak to them. 19 BY MR. HAMMOND: 20 And then when the report was issued -- and I 21 Q. understand there was a long period of time where there was 22 silence from the committee? 23 24 A. Yes.

Where nobody knew publicly what the committee was

answer would have. It has been answered.

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1	doing?			
2	A. That's right.			
3	Q. And then in February of 2009, what happened?			
4	A. The long awaited report was issued. People began			
5	to read it and react to it. Arizona			
6	MR. BUTNER: Objection. Relevance.			
7	THE COURT: I have the answer. Next question.			
8	BY MR. HAMMOND:			
9	Q. How many was the committee report unanimous?			
10	A. Yes, it was.			
11	MR. BUTNER: Objection. Relevance.			
12	Immaterial.			
13	THE COURT: Sustained.			
14	BY MR. HAMMOND:			
15	Q. Did the work of the committee result in			
16	conferences in the scientific and folensic science community			
17	in the year-and-a-half since February of 2009?			
18	A. Yes.			
19	MR. BUTNER: Objection. Relevance.			
20	Immaterial. Leading.			
21	THE COURT: Overruled.			
22	THE WITNESS: There have been many			
23	conferences, many reactions because it is a very strong			
24	maybe denunciation is too strong a word. I can't think of a			
25	good synonym, but it expressed great concern.			

MR. BUTNER: Objection. Hearsay. 1 THE COURT: Sustained. 2 THE WITNESS: Shall I read from the report? 3 MR. HAMMOND: No. 4 Professor Saks, as someone who is intimately 5 Q. involved in the field of law and science, who is a member of 6 the faculty at Arizona State University College of Law, have 7 you been a first-hand observer of the reactions to and the 8 steps that have been taken within the forensic science 9 community since February of 2009? 1.0 I have attended -- I was invited to attend some 11 Α. American Academy of Forensic Sciences meetings to participate 12 in some of those discussions We held our own conference at 13 ASU with about 30 participants, including members of the 14 committee, members of the forensic science community, members 15 of the legal community. 16 MR. BUTNER: Objection. Foundation. 17 Relevance, and it's a narrative. 18 THE COURT: Overruled. 19 BY MR. HAMMOND: 20 Was the conference that you just spoke about in 21 April of 2009? 22 Correct. 23 Α. And there have been conferences scheduled by the 24 American Academy of Forensic Scientists? 25

MR. BUTNER: Objection. Leading. 1 THE COURT: Sustained. 2 3 BY MR. HAMMOND: Have there been conferences scheduled and held 0. since the publication of the National Academy of Sciences 5 б report? MR. BUTNER: Objection. Leading. 7 THE COURT: Overruled. 8 THE WITNESS: There have been conferences, 9 many by judges, judicial conferences. The American Academy 10 of Forensic Sciences --11 MR. BUTNER: Objection. Narrative. 12 Nonresponsive, Your Honor. Lack of foundation. 13 THE COURT: Overruled. 14 THE WITNESS: There have been conferences in 15 the legal community. There have been conferences -- well, it 16 is not so much conferences called especially for it, but 17 within the forensic science community, it appears that 18 19 meetings that already were scheduled --MR. BUTNER: Objection. There is no question 20 even before him about what he is talking about now, Judge. 21 22 Narrative. THE COURT: The answer was just interrupted by 23 an objection that was overruled Finish your answer. 24 THE WITNESS: There was meetings already 25

scheduled to take place by forensic science organizations. 1 2 Understandably a focus of those was the National Academy 3 report. BY MR. HAMMOND: 4 Have you, in fact, written at least one article 5 Q. yourself that appeared in the Judicature Magazine, the 6 publication of the American Judicature Society on this 7 subject and the subject of the report? 8 9 I wrote, essentially, a synopsis of the report for 10 Judicature. And that report was published sometime in the last 11 12 12 months? December of 2009. 13 Α. You said that you also had spoken at or been 14 Ο. invited to attend some of these conferences that you have 15 spoken about? 16 That's correct. 17 Α. You talked about the seminar that they teach at 18 0. 19 the Arizona State College of Law. In the course of that seminar, have you spoken about the work of the National 20 Academy of Sciences and the report issued in 2009? 21 Yes, we did. 22 Α. From the standpoint of a scholar in the field of 23 Q.

law and science, can you please explain to the Court why it

is that that report is -- the NAS report -- is of critical

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importance to people in your field? 1 MR. BUTNER: Objection. Relevance. 2 THE COURT: Sustained. 3 BY MR. HAMMOND: 4 Are you familiar with the legislation that was 5 passed here in the month of May, signed by the Governor, with 6 respect to changing the standards for the admissibility of 7 evidence in criminal cases? 8 I have read it. A 9 Are the words used in that statute also words that 10 Q. are used in topics discussed at length in the National 11 Academy of Sciences report issued in February of 2009? 12 MR. BUTNER: Objection. Relevance. 13 THE COURT: Sustained. 14 BY MR. HAMMOND: 15 In your experience as a teacher and as a member of 16 the law and science community is there a connection between 17 the words used in the Arizona state statute and the body of 18 forensic science concerns expressed by the National Academy? 19 MR. BUTNER: Objection. Relevance. 20 Foundation. 21 THE COURT: Overruled. 22 THE WITNESS: The language of the statute, 23 which to a considerable extent mirrors Daubert and the 24 re-advised Federal Rule of Evidence 702, is overwhelmingly 25

concerned with the validity of offerings by expert witnesses, 1 which in the sciences depends --2 MR. BUTNER: Objection. Narrative. He is 3 engaged in offering an opinion on what the language means as 4 compared with Daubert. Not responsive to the question. 5 THE COURT: Overruled. 6 THE WITNESS: Which is what the NAS report is 7 all about. 8 BY MR. HAMMOND: 9 You used the word "validity." Is that a term of 10 art that has a special meaning as it applies to comparison 1.1 12 evidence? It is a term of art in science generally, which in 13 Daubert -- the Daubert opinion takes pains to use the synonym. 14 "evidentiary reliability." Evidentiary reliability, 15 validity --16 MR. BUTNER: Objection. Commenting on 17 Daubert, explaining the decision -18 THE COURT: Sustained. 19 MR. BUTNER: Thank you. 20 BY MR. HAMMOND: 21 Explain to us what the connection is between the 22 **0.** word "validity" and "reliability." 23 As scientists use those terms, reliability refers 24 to the ability for any kind of measuring instrument, 25

including a human being, to produce the same result each time it measures the same thing. If you do not have reliability, 2 you can't have validity. If you do have reliability, you 3 still may not have validity. Validity refers to the ability 4 of that measuring instrument to measure what it purports to 5 measure. We have heard testimony here in the last -- today, and you have read the interviews of people who intend to 8 testify as experts with respect to comparison evidence or 9 impression evidence. Is that correct? 10 Yes. Α. 11 Do you have an opinion with respect to whether 12 there has been any proof offered here of validity testing of 1.3 that work? 14 MR. BUTNER: Objection. Lack of foundation. 1.5 He is not a scientist in that field. He's already testified 16 about that, Judge. 17 THE COURT: Sustained. 18 19 BY MR. HAMMOND: You know what to look for in every forensic 20 Q. science field when you are looking for validity and 21 reliability of testing. Have you seen any here? 22 MR. BUTNER: Objection. Foundation. 23 THE COURT: Sustained. 24 MR. HAMMOND: Okay. 25

Q. Let me ask you the same question with respect to peer review, as you understand that term and as you described it for us this afternoon. Have you seen any evidence here in court or in the reports of the interviews that you read that would constitute peer review as you understand that term?

MR. BUTNER: Objection. Foundation.

THE COURT: Sustained.

BY MR. HAMMOND:

Q. Let me ask you the same question with respect to error rates, as you defined that term and as it is understood in the forensic science and scientific communities. Have you seen anything in this courtroom or in the readings that you have done in connection to this proceeding that would establish error rates in this court?

MR. BUTNER: Objection. Foundation.

THE COURT: Sustained.

MR. HAMMOND: Give me a moment.

(Whereupon, a discussion was held off the record.)

MR. HAMMOND: Your Honor, I do have a number of other questions about the work of the National Academy of Sciences and the report that they have issued and the consequences of that report. But if the Court is not prepared to hear anymore of that, then I don't have any further questions.

THE COURT: Mr. Butner.

MR. BUTNER: Judge --

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MR. HAMMOND: Your Honor, I probably should have asked the question differently. Am I correct in assuming that the Court is not interested in hearing anymore about that topic?

THE COURT: I guess, in terms of what is necessary in the hearing, I think I am constricted by what the law directs me to do in terms of the legal precedent and whether or not such questions such as whether or not the new Arizona law should or should not be applied to the circumstances of this case. In terms of having the witness comment on the law or what the Court should do, I don't think I should properly receive that testimony.

MR. HAMMOND: There are -- all I want to be sure that we understand, Your Honor, is that there are reasons why these words got into this statute from a scientific standpoint and from the standpoint of people in the law and science community, and those reasons relate very closely to work done by the National Academy.

THE COURT: I think that the witness is qualified to talk about his own scientific background, in terms of social sciences and social psychology, statistical studies and how that relates to any information presented by any forensic scientist. But in terms of, in essence, advising the Court what the law is or applicability of that

in the particular case, commenting on what other witnesses have testified to or have talked about in their interviews, I don't think that is a proper subject for commentary by the witness.

MR. HAMMOND: I don't intend to ask him any further questions about that. Your Honor, but there are four concepts here that are of critical importance.

questioning with regard to those <code>Daubert-type</code> concepts, or as applied through the Arizona law that becomes effective probably during the course of the trial, with commenting in his field of expertise with regard to that. So, if you think that there is some additional information that I haven't received that I ought to that would help me make a decision on whether or not if one applies the statute or if one applies <code>Daubert</code>, or alternatively <code>Frye</code>, to or any other applicable legal theory to the presentation of the evidence, I am willing to hear it.

MR. HAMMOND: I think that the --

THE COURT: Part of that may be Rule 702, because I think both sides are at disagreement as to what rule ought to apply to the evidence, prospective evidence that is going to be presented.

 $$\operatorname{\mathtt{MR}}$.$ HAMMOND: I understand that is a legal question.

THE COURT: That is a legal question. To the 1 2 extent that there is an overlap with the social scientists that you think I need to have some additional definition for 3 making a decision with regard to those points, I am willing 4 to hear that. 5 MR. HAMMOND: Well, it seemed to us, and 6 before I am through examining Professor Saks, I would like to 7 8 be sure that the Court is comfortable with what the scientific community understands when they hear phrases like 9 10 "peer review." THE COURT: Yes, and I am not trying to limit 11 your questioning with regard to those things. 12 MR. HAMMOND: Well, then let's talk and we 13 will wrap up on this series of questions. 14 When scientists talk about the concept of peer 15 review, let's make sure we have your best testimony while you 16 17 are here of what that phrase means. MR. BUTNER: Objection. Asked and answered. 18 THE COURT: To some extent it was, but go 19 ahead and clarify. You may answer. Overruled. 20 THE WITNESS: The fundamental concern to which 21 that is aimed is the validity of research, proper research 22 design. Peer review is one tool for helping to ensure or to 23 24 evaluate the research design

MR. HAMMOND: Sorry, Your Honor. Were you

about to ask a question? 1 THE COURT: No. I was making sure that my 2 transcript was still going. 3 BY MR. HAMMOND: 4 Q. As that term is understood in the scientific 5 community, does it constitute peer review for one office 6 worker to simply have his work reviewed by another person in 7 8 that office? MR. BUTNER: Objection. Asked and answered. 9 Foundation. 10 THE COURT: Overculed. 11 THE WITNESS: In the larger scientific 12 community, it does not. I do appreciate that in the forensic 13 sciences they have come to use that term to describe what you 14 asked about. 15 MR. BUTNER: Objection. Foundation. 16 17 THE COURT: Overruled. BY MR. HAMMOND: 18 When you say you have come to understand that that 19 Ο. term is used in a different way in the forensic science 20 community than in the scientific community, explain to the 21 22 Court what you mean. MR. BUTNER: Objection. Foundation, Judge. 23 THE COURT: Overruled. 24 THE WITNESS: Well, as we heard today, when a 25

	colleague double-checks someone's report, that has come in					
	some crime labs that has come to be called peer review.					
BY MR. HAMMOND:						
	Q. As you understand that term in the scientific					
community, is it peer review or it is a misnomer?						
	A. The larger scientific community would certainly					
	not understand the term in that fashion, and it seems to have					
become fashionable post <i>Daubert</i>						
	Q. Fashionable post <i>Daubert</i> to what?					
	A. Among forensics scientists.					
	MR. BUTNER: Objection. Outside of his field					
	of expertise. Lack of foundation, Judge.					
	THE COURT: Overruled.					
	BY MR. HAMMOND?					
	Q. You can complete your answer.					
	MR. BUTNER: May I have this witness on voir					
	dire, Judge?					
	THE COURT: No you will have cross.					
	THE WITNESS: Peer review has a very well					
	established meaning in the larger sciences. That is what to Supreme Court in Daubert was talking about.					
	MR. BUTNER: Objection. Outside his field					
	THE COURT: Sustained. I will strike the					
	reference to what the Supreme Court was or was not talking					
	about.					

1	Go ahead			
2	BY MR. HAMMOND:			
3	Q. The case itself will show what the Supreme Court			
4	was talking about. What I would like you to do is just			
5	complete your answer so we have it all in one place on what			
6	the concept of peer review means to the scientific community.			
7	MR. BUTNER: Objection. Asked and answered.			
8	THE COURT: Overruled.			
9	THE WITNESS: It refers to having one's			
10	colleagues review research that has been submitted to			
11	journals, published by journals and afterwards. It is the			
12	process of the community critiquing its own products.			
13	BY MR. HAMMOND:			
14	Q. And if there had been in any field that kind of			
15	peer review borne of publication and borne of the interchange			
16	of ideas, would we be able to see it in the published			
17	literature?			
18	MR. BUTNER: Objection. Speculation.			
19	Ambiguous. Vague. Irrelevant.			
20	THE COURT: Overruled.			
21	THE WITNESS: I am not sure what you are			
22	asking.			
23	THE COURT: Okay, so maybe it was vague. 1			
24	stand corrected.			
25	MR. BUTNER: Thanks, Judge. Thank you,			

Professor Saks.

THE COURT: Try again, Mr. Hammond.

BY MR. HAMMOND:

Q. How would a court know, how would anyone know, whether a Court or a lawyer, anyone know whether a discipline, a comparison evidence discipline had been subjected to peer review?

MR. BUTNER: Objection. Foundation.

THE COURT: Overruled.

THE WITNESS: One would need to look at the literature that is relevant to the task at hand -- to borrow some more Supreme Court language -- the task at hand by the witness who is being proffered in court, look at the empirical research literature that is offered in support of those techniques or opinions, then the Court is stuck with the problem of evaluating the research which is what peer review should help with.

BY ME. HAMMOND:

- Q. So, in the disciplines that we typically talk about and that you talk about in your class, would we be able to go to some published source and find peer reviewed articles on that topic?
- A. Well, let's be clear. There are articles published in forensic science. They appear in forensic science journals, and those journals are, quote, peer review.

The question is do those studies ask questions about the issue that the witness has come to court to talk about, and 2 are those studies of adequate quality to provide an answer? 3 That is the question that we could all address if 4 0. we had those studies. If those studies had been brought into 5 this court in the field of shoe print comparison --6 MR. BUTNER: Objection. Argument, Judge. 7 THE COURT: Sustained. 8 BY MR. HAMMOND: 9 In the fields of science in which you have been 10 Ο. involved, would you expect to find that the critical analysis 1 1 underlying that field is contained in published literature 12 that you could look at? 13 In virtually any field one -- in virtually any 1.4 science one would care to look at, one would be able to find 15 a body of such research, and then the debate becomes how good 16 of a study and what do they show? 17 That is my last question. If we had found that 18 O. literature, would scientists be able to debate the validity 19 of the conclusions in those published works? 20 Α. Yes. 21 MR. HAMMOND. Thank you. 22 I have no further questions. 23 THE COURT: I think we probably ought to take 24 the break before we move on. So take a ten-minute recess. 25

1	(Brief recess.)				
2	THE COURT: Record reflects the presence of				
3	the defendant, his three lawyers, and the two prosecuting				
4	attorneys, and Dr. Saks is still on the stand.				
5	Mr. Butner.				
6	MR. BUTNER: State has no questions.				
7	THE COURT: All right. May the Professor be				
8	excused then at this time?				
9	MR. HAMMOND: He may, Your Honor.				
10	THE COURT: Being no objections, you are				
11	excused from additional testimony. Thank you, Professor.				
12	(Whereupon, these partial proceedings were concluded.)				
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CERTIFICATE

I, ROXANNE E. TARN, CR, a Certified Reporter in the State of Arizona, do hereby certify that the foregoing pages 1 - 55 constitute a full, true, and accurate transcript of the proceedings had in the foregoing matter, all done to

SIGNED and dated this 13th day of June, 2010.

ROXANNE E. TARN, CR Certified Reporter Certificate No. 50808

the best of my skill and ability.

Michael J. Saks

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Education

BA	Academic curriculum	1965	Philadelphia Central High School
BA	English	1969	Pennsylvania State University
BS	Psychology	1969	Pennsylvania State University
MA	Social Psychology	1972	Ohio State University
PhD	Social Psychology	1975	Ohio State University
MSL	Law	1983	Yale Law School

Professional Employment History

Arizona State University: Regents Proffessor (2009-present), Alan A. Matheson Professor of Law (2008-2009), Professor of Law (2000-2008), Professor of Psychology (2000-present), Faculty Fellow of the Center for the Study of Law, Science & Technology (2000-present), Visiting Professor of Law (Spring, 1998)

University of Iowa: Edward F. Howrey Professor of Law (1998-2000), Professor of Law (1988-1998), Visiting Professor (1986-88) Professor of Psychology (1992-2000)

Ohio State Univ College of Law: Drinko-Baker & Hostetler Visiting Prof (Spring, 1991)

Georgetown University Law Center, Visiting Interdisciplinary Professor (1985-1986)

University of Virginia Law School, Visiting Professor (Summer LL.M. Program for Appellate Judges, 1981, 1983, 1985, 1987, 1989)

National Center for State Courts, Senior Staff Associate (1978-1980)

American University School of Justice, Adjunct Professor (1980)

Boston College Law School, Adjunct Professor (1974-78, 1985)

Boston College, Department of Psychology, Assistant Professor (1973-1979), Associate Professor (1979-1988)

Honors, Awards, Etc.

University Fellow, Ohio State University (1969-1973)

Dissertation Award, 2d Prize, Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues (1975)

Alumnus of the Year (1984) Ogontz Campus Alumni Society, Pennsylvania State University

Fellow of the American Psychological Association

Fellow of the American Psychology-Law Society

Fellow of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues

Award for Distinguished Contributions to Psychology in the Public Interest, American Psychological Association (1987)

President, American Psychology-Law Society (1988-89)

Listed in Who's Who in the World, Who's Who in America, etc.

University of Iowa Faculty Scholar (1990-1993)

Chair, Section on Law and Social Science, AALS (1997)

Professional Association Activities

Law School Admissions Council

Test Development and Research Committee

Grants Subcommittee (Chair)

American Psychological Association (1975-Present)

Task Force on Psychology and Public Policy, Member (1980-84)

Task Force on Ethics [Education in APA Approved Graduate Programs], Committee on the Protection of Human Participants in Research (1984-87)

American Psychology-Law Society (Division 41 of APA)

Secretary (1979-1984)

Member of Executive Committee (1982-1990)

President (1988-89)

Co-chair, Pro Bono Amicus Project (1989-1994)

Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues

Member of Council (Directors)

Founding Chair of Courtwatch Committee (1978-1984)

Association of American Law Schools, President, Section on Law and Social Science (1997)

Law & Society Association (Harry Kalven Prize Committee, 1990-91)

Evaluation Research Society

Policy Studies Organization

Society for the Advancement of Social Psychology

Consulting and Other Professional Work (Selected)

Best Practices Institute of the National Center for State Courts, member of Advisory Board (2000 - present)

Center for Justice and Democracy, member of Advisory Board (2000 - present)

Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government

National Science Foundation, Law & Social Sciences Program, member of advisory panel

U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Task Force on Medical Liability and Malpractice

Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department Crime Laboratory

Judicial Evaluation Committee, District of Columbia Bar Association

Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress

Expert witness in a number of cases (topics: jury reactions to evidence of prior crimes, effects of electoral decision-making on trial decision-making, validity and reliability of forensic handwriting identification)

Law firm of Ennis, Friedman, Bersoff & Ewing, Washington (assistance in drafting Brandeis Brief for U.S. Supreme Court)

Law firm of Donovan, Liesure, Newton, and Irvine, New York, (strategy planning in international antitrust case)

Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada

Federal Judicial Center, Washington, D.C.

American Bar Association/American Society of Law and Medicine

Attorneys General Massachusetts and North Carolina

Abt Associates, Cambridge, MA
National Resource Center for Consumers of Legal Services, Washington
Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University
Orient State Institute, Orient, Ohio
College of Pharmacy, Ohio State University
Children's Hospital, Columbus, Ohio

Teaching

Undergraduate Courses

Social Psychology
Research Methods
Introduction to Psychology
Statistics
Applied Social Psychology
Law and Psychology
Environmental and Social Determinants of Behavior

Graduate Courses

Social Psychology Social Science and Public Policy

Law Courses

Criminal Law

Criminal Law Reform

Evaluation and Use of Empirical Evidence

Evidence

Law and Psychology of the Litigation Process

Law, Litigation, and Science

Mental Health Law; Law and Psychiatry

Social Science in Law (in UVa Judges' Program titled: Social Science and Judicial Process)

Torts

Conflict: Its Nature and Resolution (Seminar)

Interdisciplinary Perspectives in Evidence and Procedure (Seminar)

Law and Forensic Science (Seminar)

Law and Technology: Assisted Death (Model act drafting seminar)

Law and Technology: Organ Transplantation (Model act drafting seminar)

Law and Technology: Scientific Expert Witnesses (Model act drafting seminar)

Erroneous Convictions: Their Prevention and Remedy (Model act drafting seminar)

Roots of Evidence Law (Seminar)

Tort Reform (Seminar)

Property II

Social Science Research and Legal Policy Making (Seminar)

Editorial Service

Editor: Law & Human Behavior (1985-1987)

Editor: Jurimetrics (2003-2005)

General Editor

APA MONITOR Judicial Notebook (founder) (1978-84) Advances in Applied Social Psychology Series (founder) (LEA, 1988-1990)

Member of Editorial Boards (past and current)

Journal of the Forensic Institute (Britain)

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
Law & Society Review
Law & Human Behavior
Law & Policy
Applied Social Psychology Annual
Social Behaviour: An International Journal of Applied Social Psychology (Britain)
Ethics and Behavior
Expert Evidence (Britain)
Legal & Criminological Psychology (Britain)

Ad Hoc Peer Reviewer

Forensic Science International International Statistical Review Journal of Organization Behavioral and Human Performance

University Service

Pennsylvania State University: University Colloquy, member, executive committee (1969); Department of Psychology, member, curriculum committee (1968-69)

Ohio State University: Council of Graduate Students; Council of Student Affairs; Advisory Committee to the Vice- President for Business and Finance; Health Insurance Subcommittee; Faculty Council; University Senate; Grievance Procedures Subcommittee; University Court

Boston College Psychology Department: Undergraduate Curriculum Committee; Faculty Search Committee; Colloquium Committee

University of Iowa: Advisory Committee to V.P. for Research; Statistical Advisory Committee to Academic V.P. College of Law Committees: Speakers; Research and Professional Development; Faculty Appointments; Internal Procedures; Teaching Improvement; Retention Committee. Committee to Review Department of Management and Organizations (1994)

Public Service

Ohio Civil Liberties Union: Board of Directors, Member (1972-73); Central Ohio Chapter, Board of Directors (1971-73), Chair (1972-73).

Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts: Advisory Committee to the Board of Directors (1984-1986); Legislative Committee; Subcommittee on Victims' Rights, Chair

Subcommittee on Organ and Tissue Transplants, Special Legislative Commission on Experimental Biomedical Research, Massachusetts Legislature, 1975

Morse's Pond Association (local conservation group) (1975-1978)

Flaschner Judicial Institute (member of subcommittee which developed a series of continuing judicial education programs for Massachusetts trial judges) (1983-1986)

Iowa Social Science Institute (1995-2000)

Woodland Heights Association, President (1991-92)

Michael's Ranch HOA and Water Users Association, President (2002-2004)

Board of Directors, Iowa City Area Science Center (1992-2000)

Advisory Board, Center for Justice and Democracy (2001 -)

Advisory Board, Best Practices Institute, National Center for State Courts (2001-)

Publications

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Saks, M.J., Werner, C.M., & Ostrom, T.M. The Presumption of Innocence and the American Juror. 2 JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY LAW (Winter) 46-54.

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- Gittler, J., Quigley-Rick, M., and Saks, M.J. Adolescent Health Care Decision-making: The Law and Public Policy. Background Paper for Congressional Office of Technology Assessment and Carnegie Council on Adolescent Development.
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- Saks, M.J. Uncovering the Secrets of the Common Law. Review essay: K.L. Scheppele, Legal Secrets: Equality and Efficiency in the Common Law (1988). In 24 LAW & SOCIETY REVIEW 1277.

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- Saks, M.J. Turning Practice into Progress: Better Lawyering Through Experimentation, 66 Notre Dame Law Review 801.
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- Charrow, R.P. & Saks, M.J. Legal Responses to Allegations of Scientific Misconduct. In D.J. Miller & M. Hersen (Eds.) RESEARCH FRAUD IN THE BEHAVIORAL AND BIOMEDICAL SCIENCES. New York: Wiley.
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